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CHINA:

A NEW RELATIONSHIP

Commencement Address by Senator Mike Mansfield (D., Montana)
Rocky Mountain College, Billings, Montana
Monday, May 29, 1972, 9:30a.m., M.S.T.

I would like to share with you on this day which is
of great importance to you some thoughts of world affairs.

One

aspect of this subject, in particular, begs for your understanding
and attention.
and China.

That is the relationship between the United States

It is uppermost in my mind, at this time, because I

have only this month returned from a journey to Peking.

The

i mpressions of the visit to that capital and several other Chinese
cities are still very vivid.

So, too, are my discussions with

leaders of the People's Republic.
This is a notable year in U.S.-China relations.

The

first significant steps in 25 years have been taken towards a
general revi sion of dealings with China.

The initiative was

long overdue and, hence the backlog of unfinished business is
very heavy.
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Almost a quarter of a century ago, we cut ourselves
off, as a matter of deliberate policy, from all normal relations
with the largest nation on earth.

We did so by misreading or

distorting, in an official sense, the implicat i ons of the Chinese
revolution which brought a new government to Peking in 1949.
Thereafter, we acted on the legal pretense that the Pe o ple's
Republic of Ch i na did not exi st.

Even as we pretended it was no t

there, we invested heav i ly in an elaborate system of c ostly constra i nts to curtail that government.
The price of this det a chment fr om reality was not
trivial.

Qui te apart from billions spent for counterpoises to

China throughout Asia, our present i nvolvement in Viet Nam can
be cons i dered, in large measure, to be pa rt of the pr i ce of this
c onstra i nt.

So, too, was our earl i er invo lvement in Korea.

These and other military act ions were undertaken in the
name of a policy called "containment" which was based on a set of
assumpti ons about the nature of events in China, as we guessed or

persuaded ourselves to bel i eve them to be.

These assumptions were

made in a vacuum because of our isolation from the Chinese mainland.
Not surprisingly, many of them turned out to be highly inaccurate.
The tragic cost of the miscalculations can be stated
in terms of the lives lost, the bod i es maimed and the resources
squandered all around the rimlands of Asia, particularly in Korea
and Indochi na.

To be sure, we cannot est imate what the alternative

costs might have been had we acted on more accurate assumptions,
or had we taken no action at all .

Simp l y on the bas i s o f what

did happen, however, history may well record these miscalculat ions
regard i ng Chi na, as among the most cost l y of all time.
I might say, parenthetica lly, that we are at a cruc ial
point, at the present time, in determining whether we will pers i st
i n thi s mistaken course.
the past few weeks.

I refer to events in Viet Nam dur i ng

The new U. S. air a nd sea actions are vest igial

responses whic h arise from the old, not the new Chi na policy whi ch

- 4 was signaled by the President's visit to Peking.

Whatever the

success of these new war measures, they will not alter in any
way the overwhelming need of this nation to disengage completely
from the Indochina conflict.

We need to do so, not to satisfy

Hanoi or Peking or Moscow, but in order to serve our own national
interests.

If we have learned anything to date from thi s conflict,

it is that we have no national stake in that conflict except an
end t o further casualties and the return of the prisoners of wa r
and the missing in action.

The course of action best calculated

t o serve these nat i onal needs remains to negotiate the best political solution without further recourse to arms and to get out of
Indochina, lock, stock and barrel.
But, to return to the central theme of my remarks, it
is revealing t o ask ourselves how we became involved in Viet Nam
in the f i rst place.

How did we permit ourselves to make such

faulty commi tments with such disastrous consequences?

We get
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some clues, I think, when we review the spectrum of our relationship wi th China over the last two centuries.
More than with other nations, our relationship with
China has been subject

t~

the ebb and flow of popular myth.

We

have tended to oscillate from one oversimplified view of China
t o another.

For almost two centuries, China has been viewed,

alternately, as benign or virulent, friendly or host i le, wise
or foolish.
Like the

11

yin 11 and

11

yang 11 of Chinese cosmology which

holds that life is the product of a dualism of o pposites, our
image of China has gone from one extreme to the other.

On the

one hand, there has been the image of the China of wisdom, intelligence, i ndustry, pi ety, stoic i sm and strength.

That is the

benign Ch ina of Marco Polo and Pearl S. Buck; i t i s the Chi na of
the Charlie Chan movies and of the st or i es of heroic res i stance
to Japan in the l930 1 s.

- 6 On the other hand, there has been the image of the
China of cruelty, barbarism, violence, and faceless hordes.
This is the China of drum-head trials, opium dens, bandits,
summary executions, Fu Manchu, and the Boxer Rebellion.
In the late 18th century, we looked up to China as an
anc i ent civilizat ion--superior in many aspects of technol ogy,
culture, and soc ial order and surrounded by an air of s pl end i d
and imper ial mystery.

In that period, the China trade was s ought

eager l y by the Clipper ships and Chi nese produce was highly valued
notab l y along the Eastern Seaboard and in Europe.
Respect turned to contempt, however, with China's
quick defeat i n the Opium War of 1840.

There followed acts of

humil iation of China such as our part icipation i n extra-territoria l
treaty r ights and the Chinese Exclus ion Act of the last ha lf of
the 19th century.

- 7 In theearly 20th century, attitudes sh i fted again ta
benevolence.

American missionaries of many faiths made China

a favored field for proselytizing and education.

In this per io d,

the Chi nese became, far this nation, a guided, guarded, and adored
people.
Chinese res i stance ta the Japanese invasion in 1937
produced another shift from benevolence ta admiration .

At the

end of the Sec ond World War, admiration was displaced by disappointment and frustation, as the wart ime truce between Nat iona list
and Communist forces collapsed in internal strife.

This nation

became profoundly disenchanted wi th China, a disenchantment which
was replaced abruptly in 1949 by hostility.

U. S. Secretaries of

State turned the i r backs on Chinese leaders and spoke of the mehace
of "Chinese hordes" as predecessors had spoken with similar revulsion of the

11

yellow peril. 11
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The hostility was largely a react i on, of course, to
the coming to power of a Communist regime on the Chinese mainland.
We were not only djsmayed by th i s development, we saw it almost
as a national affront.

Peking was viewed as a treacherous ex-

tension of the Soviet steamroller which had reduced Eastern and
Central Europe to subservience at the end of World War II.

China

became in our eyes the Eastern puppet of world communism, to be
manipulated by strings pulled in Moscow.
After Ch i nese forces intervened in the war in Korea
where, incidentally, Mao Tse-tung lost his eldest son, U. S.
policy was cast anew on the premise that the government on the
Chinese mainland was an aggressor.

It was seen as ready to use

force to impose international Communism anywhere in Asia.

Con-

versely, it was assumed that if the endorsement of the free nations
were withheld, thi s reg i me which was said to be "alien" to the
Chinese people would wither and collapse.

- 9 On this premise, it was rationalized that recognition
must not be extended to Peking.

Instead, the official American

view was that the Chinese National Government, which had retreated
to the island of Taiwan, continued to speak for all of China.

We

cut off trade with the Chinese mainland and did whatever could be
done to encourage other countries to follow suit.

In a similar

fashion, a diplomatic campaign was conducted year after year
against the seating of the Chinese People's Republic in the United
Nations.
We drew an arc of military alliances on the seaward
side of Chi na and undergirded them with the deployment of massive
U. S. military power in bases throughout the Western Pacific.
of billions of dollars were expended in this process.

Tens

Much of

this immense outpouring of effort and money seems incredible now
in the light of the President's recent visits to Peking and to
Moscow.

Yet, it has continued for 20 years and, of course, is

still going on, notably, in Indochina.

- 10 -

As has been suggested, this last quarter century of
China policy has been characterized by delusion and miscalculation.
We assumed, for example, that the Chinese Communists would be unable
to govern.

We assumed that the Peking government would be an ex-

tension of Soviet Communism and a willing accomplice to Soviet
purpose and design.

And we assumed that the Chinese government

would be bent on territorial aggrandizement.
All of these assumptions have proved to be erroneous.
In the first place, of the numerous divisions which have arisen
within the Communist world, the differences between Moscow and
Peking have been the most significant.

They so remain today

although the rasping edges of the conflict appear somewhat tempered
by the periodic flare-ups of the war in Viet Nam.
At the same time, the government of the People's Republic
has not only survived, it has provided the Chinese people with
effective leadership .

Chinese society has achieved a considerable
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degree of economic, scientific and social progress.

A modern

technology has been developed which is sophisticated enough to
turn out products ranging from needles and hand-tools to thermonuclear devices, earth satellites and the rockets to place them
in orbit.

A powerful national momentum has been generated which

is proving sufficient to supply an enormous population with the
wherewithal of decent survival and an improving livelihood.
Notwithstanding a ssumptions to the contrary, the Chinese
government has not shown any great eagerness to use its own armed
forces to spread its control abroad.

Where Chinese armies have

been employed they have been used to assert traditional territorial
claims, or in expression of concern for the safety of China's
borders.
ventures.

China has not become enmeshed in foreign military adIn Viet Nam, for example, the Chinese military involve-

ment has been peripheral.

There is Chinese equipment in South

Viet Nam but there are no Chinese battal ions .

In North Viet Nam
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reports have indicated the presence, from time to t ime, not of
Chinese combat units, but of labor troops engaged in repairing
bomb damage to roads, railroads, bridges and the like.
Chinese actions in Tibet, and along the Himalayan
frontier with India, are often cited as examples of militant
Communist aggression.

Nevertheless, for centur j_ es, Tibet has

been universally regarded as falling within China's over-all
boundaries.

If the Peking government claims that Tibet belongs

to Ch na, so, too, does the Chinese Nat ional Government on Taiwan.
India also acknowledges such to be the case and American policy
has never officially recognized Tibet as other than Chinese
territory.
Even in Korea, the direct Chi nese military involvement
di d not begin until United Nat i ons forces approached Chi na's
borders.

In any event, the last Chinese batallions left North

Korea years ago.
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Looking ahead, it would seem to me that Chinese energies
and res ources are going t o be so preempted by internal needs over
the next two decades that there is l i ttle likelihood that Ch i na
could post a serious military danger t o the United States even if
that were the inclination.
The evidence, in short, is ample to dispel some of the
most ala rming assumptions on which our past policies have been
based .

Of course, there is an immense potential danger in China.

There is also an immense potential da nger in every other powerful
nat ion in a world whi ch has not yet learned how to maintain
c i vilized survival in a nuclear age except on the razor's edge.
Ins ofar as Chi na i s concerned, the fundamenta l question for us
is not so much whether it is a danger, but whether our policies
wil l act t o alleviate or to exace rbate the danger.

- 14 In my judgment, these policies can alleviate the danger
only to the extent that they are based on premises that correspond
more nearly to realities than has been the case in the past.
wi ll serve no useful purpose to flail at windmills .
have, in 1972, at last penetrated the shroud of

It

Now that we

~bscurity

surround-

i ng China, there is reas on to hope that our judgments and actions
regarding China and Asia, henceforth, will be better informed.
In th i s new phase of our relat ions with China, we must
beware, of course, that the old pendulum of myth does not now
swing to the other extreme, thereby creating a new image of China
whic h is as unreal as the old.

We must guard against becomi ng too

enamoured of the splendors of a newly rev ived amity.

Banquets

and toasts and shark's fin soup do no t of themselves assure a new
order of world affairs .
To keep the pendulum in equilibrium in our current approach to China, it would be well to heed a rule laid down by

- 15 Lord

Palmerst~n,

the prime Minister of Great Britain in the

1860's, who declared:
"We have no eternal allies, and we
have no perpetual enemies.

"

Our experiences in postwar World War II relations with Germany
and Japan underscore this observation.
We have not always been very astute about defining
where our real interests lie .

We have often tended to confuse

them with fleeting and transitory images of friendliness or
animosity .

This is all too true in the case of China where, for

25 years, we have been obsessed with the assumed threat of a perpetual enemy.

In fact, we might well have avoided the untold

misery and loss of life and resources of the peripheral war in
Indochina, had we forgone the poses of power and, instead, taken
a harder view of our national interests.
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While we cannot identify national interests with exactitude, we do have it wi thin our means to determine much more clearly
where it is that they do not lie.
in

th ~ s

connection.

The President has shown the way

Even before his visit to Peking, he had laid

the groundwork for reestablishing more normal contact with the
People's Republic of China by the removal of discriminatory restriction on travel of Americans to the Chinese mainland and by ending
the embargo on trade with China.

The embargo had been imposed

during the Korean War and was of a design so tight as to exclude
even chop-sticks .

The fact is, however, that for two decades, it

had had no economic impact on Chi na and had served only to injure
our own traders.

By ending the boycott on the eve of his visit

China
to China, the President removed what was, at most, an irritant to I
but which would have hampered his efforts to br i ng about the
beginn i ngs of a reconciliation.
As it was, President Nixon was able to lay the groundwork
for the growth of contact between the two nations.

The chances

- 17 are good that the months and years ahead will see a gradual inc rease
in exchanges between China and the United States in medicine and
health, science, j ournal ism ,

athleti~s,

the arts and other pursuits .

An increase in trade i s also to be anticipated .

The

Chinese are in an excellent position to move forward in this connec tion.

It has been their practice to keep imports and exports, world -

wide, in rough balance .
debt.

They have neither external nor internal

They have ample exchange r eserves .

Their international re -

putat i on for integrity and reliability in commercial transati.ons
is already very good.

A great range of Chinese products is avail -

able for sale in the world markets a nd the Chinese also have a
substantial shopping list for imports wh ich will he lp to speed
their own development and strengthen their economic self-reliance .
Exchanges can take place, in my judgment, even though
the issue of Taiwan remains, f i nal l y, to be r esolved .

Pres i dent

Nixon has acknowledged as valid, Peking's claim that the island
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i s part of China.

That claim, incidentally) is susta i ned by the

Ch i nese government on Taiwan.

With the assu r ance that the Un i ted

States wi ll n ot pursue a two-Chi na policy) Pek i ng i s prepared to
go ahead i n ree stab l ishing contact wi th this nat ion wh 1le exploring
in i ts own fas hi on t he road to reunif ; cat t on of the i sla nd wi th
the ma i nland.
Beyond exchanges between Chi na and the Un i ted States)
there l oom la r g er quest ions of peace a nd security in the Western
Pac ifi c.

Even as we meet here t oday, weawa i t the

conse quences

of the l a test es ca la t 5on of the U. S. i nvo lvement i n Vi et Nam as
well as the ful l impo rt of the Pres i dent's d i scuss i ons i n Moscow.
One can only ho pe t hat we have seen the last res ort t o retal i at ion
in Indochina , the f i na l burst of th i s wasting conflict and that
progress can now be expected toward a genui ne po litical settlement.
In all ca nd or) the reco r d of this tragic wa r prov i des
little grounds f a r o pt i mi sm in th i s respect .
Camb odia d i d not produce peace .

The i nvas i on of

Nor d i d the invasi on of La os.

Nor d i d the earlier bomb ing enterpr i ses over North Vi et Nam.

- 19 Peace was the promise attached, in turn, to each of
these escalat ions of the U. S. involvement .
not to the promised peace but to

-.a

Each, in turn, led

more k i lled and maimed, more

prisoners of war, more missing in act ion, more and more billions
in expenditures to produce more and more devastation throughout
Indochina.
The end of this war has yet to come and it is not clear
yet when i t will come.

We would do well , nevertheless, to begin

to exa5ine the pos s i bilit i es of a new secur i ty system, based on
the

real~t ie s

of the 70's .

Those rea li t i es urge us to seek, in

my judgment, an equilibrium of this nat ion's interests with those
of China, J apa n, the Soviet Union and the smaller nations of the
Western Pacific .

All have a stake i n the peace of the region.

The rest orat ion of contact with China furthers the
poss i bili ty that at some time tr ipart ite discuss ions might be
held between China, J apan, and the Un ited States, if n ot quadr i part i te talks, whic h would also include the Soviet Uni on .

A
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development of this kind could do much to allay unfounded mutual
fears and to begin to come to grips with the question of adjustment
of valid nat ional interests.

It could provide insights into such

vital questi Jns as the intenti ons of the various powers i n the
Western Pacif i c and how they relate to one another, the economic
needs of the Asian nations, and the prospects for curbing nuclear
conflict.

Most i mportant, such discuss· ons might prov i de a vehicle

for genera l stab il izat i on of the

Indoch ~ na

peninsul a and Southeast

Asia in the post-war era.
Adjustments of th i s kind requi re fresh perspectives.
We need t o see the s i tuat i on as i t is t oday, ndas it appeared 20
years ago i n the cataclysmic upheaval of the Ch i nese revolution.
We need to see the situation not through the fog of an old and
stagnant host. li ty but i n the l i ght o f the enduring interests o f
the Un i ted States i n the Western Pac i fic whi ch are no less tha n a
peace of equa li ty and mutua l ity whl ch wi ll permi t a flowering of
relat i ons with all Asian nations.
more.

Nor, may I add, are they any
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I see great relevance in young men and women thinking
deeply of the i s sues wh j_ch d i vide China and the United States to
determine how they can be recast
Unl i~ e

in new and uncluttered molds.

my generation, you have already learned much about As i a .

You have a greater awareness of its importance to this nation
and

t~

the

w~rld.

~f nati ~ nal

Furthermore, you have not had the experience

trauma in moving abruptly

fr~m

an era marked by an

almost fawning benevolence t oward China to one of thorough di.senchantment.

You were spared the fierce hostilities which rent

this nat ion i nternally, as a sense of warmth, sympathy, and secur i ty
regarding China gave way to fee li ngs of revu l sion, hatred and insecurity.
Y::m young Americans and y:mr c ounterparts in Chi na wi_ll
live your ad ult yea rs i n an era in wh 1 ch much of the world's
h 1 story will be written in the

Pa ~tf ic .

WhRt y ou do , how you

relate t o one another--Chinese and Ame r ica ns- - will have much to
do with whether

~r n~t

that h i.story is wr i tten in terms of peace

and civilized human survjval.
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I have seen China off and on since I served there in the
Marines in the 1920's.

I have seen you, your parents and your

grandparents much closer up and for a much longer period of time.
I am confident about a future that belongs to your
generation, both in China and in this country of ours.

This

Republic is worthy of your best efforts not only in terms of
developing Chinese and U. S. relations, but w1 th regard to the
entire world.

You can do no more than try to achieve mutual

understanding and a peace with all peoples.
do no less.

You can and should

